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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective: To investigate the association between two measures of corruption – prevalence of 
corruption in the health sector and prevalence of bribes in the society – and antibiotic consumption 
in the European regions. Methods: Data on the dependent variable antibiotic consumption on the 
regional level comes from the 2009 Special Euro Barometer Survey. Measures of the two independ-
ent variables corruption in the health care sector and bribes in the society come from the European 
Quality of Government Index. Correlation coefficients were calculated to investigate the bivariate 
correlation between the independent variables health sector corruption and prevalence of bribes 
and the dependent variable antibiotic consumption. A multivariate regression model was built to 
investigate the association between corruption and bribes in relation to antibiotics, taking the po-
tential confounders purchasing power standardized regional GDP, regional quality of health care, 
inhabitants per medical doctor, and age-standardized all case mortality rates into consideration. 
Results: Strong and significant bivariate correlations between both corruption in the health sector 
and prevalence of bribes in society and antibiotic consumption in the European regions were 
found. In a multivariate regression model including confounders, the associations were persistent 
and strong. Conclusions: This paper demonstrates that dysfunctional regulatory systems and poor 
enforcement mechanisms seem to be factors accounting for some of the between-region variation 
in antibiotic consumption in Europe.  
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Introduction  
Antibiotic resistance – an unavoidable side-effect of the consumption of antibiotics – is one of the 
greatest global challenges to public health. Increasing bacterial resistance to existing antibiotics 
causes substantial morbidity and mortality and increases health-care and societal costs. As the 
World Health Organization (WHO) points out,  “a post-antibiotic era—in which common infec-
tions and minor injuries can kill—far from being an apocalyptic fantasy, is instead a very real possi-
bility for the 21st century” (1). In Europe alone, antimicrobial resistance is estimated to cause 
25,000 deaths each year, and result in related costs of over €1.5 billion in healthcare expenses and 
reduced productivity (2) while in America it is estimated to cause 2m illnesses and 23,000 deaths a 
year (3). If resistance is left unchecked, 10 million more people are expected to die every year by 
2050 (4). Consequently, “governments around the world are beginning to pay attention to a prob-
lem so serious that it threatens the achievements of modern medicine” (1).  
There is a growing recognition that limiting antibacterial resistance is far from just a medical con-
cern, but rather a behavioural and social problem. Since antibiotic consumption it the main driver 
of the development of antibacterial resistance, large-scale behavioural change in relation to antibi-
otic consumption is urgently called upon. Intriguingly, in a European perspective, there is huge 
variation in outpatient antibiotic consumption, variation with regard to class of antibiotics, dosage, 
and treatment duration, and variation in the quality of outpatient antibiotic consumption between 
European countries (5-9). There is also striking regional variation in penicillin consumption pat-
terns between European regions (10). This variation is unlikely to be the result of differences in 
frequency of bacterial infections (5). Take for instance, Belgium and the Netherlands, which exhibit 
remarkable differences in antibiotic use, with the former using them to a much larger extent than 
the latter. Researchers suggest that the differences noticed might instead be the result of differences 
in regulatory practices and health-care systems (5,6,11). For example, Goossens and colleagues (6) 
maintain that ineffective health-care systems and poor enforcement of regulations might explain the 
widespread non-prescription sales of antibiotics being prevalent in many European countries. Yet 
these factors may be insufficient to understand the pronounced differences across regions within 
the same country, such as the very high levels of antibiotic consumption in Spain’s Catalonia (or 
Italy’s Lazio) and the moderate levels in Spain’s Basque Country (or Italy’s Tuscany). What can 
account for such divergences across territories that, otherwise, share so many medical, economic 
and socio-cultural characteristics in common?   
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This paper brings factor that has been neglected in the existing literature to explain the puzzling 
territorial divergences in antibiotic use: the level of corruption. In doing so, we follow the increas-
ing interest among health researchers and policymakers in how corruption affects health outcomes 
(12). Corruption has been found to be negatively associated with a large variety of health care out-
puts and outcomes (13-17). The effects of corruption may matter as much – or even more than – 
traditionally explored factors such as health-spending measures (18) or the level of democratization 
(19). Corruption is not only confined to developing countries, but “corrupt practices in the health-
care plague many developed countries” (18).  
This paper uses a novel data from the European Quality of Government Index (20) that collects 
perceptions on the prevalence of bribes in the public sector in general, and the prevalence of cor-
ruption in the health sector in the regions of Europe. This data shows a large variation of the 
prevalence of corruption across regions within the European Union. Also, there is a strong bivari-
ate association between these measures of corruption at regional level and antibiotic consumption 
in the European regions – with data from a special 2009 Euro-Barometer survey on antibiotic con-
sumption. When controlling in multivariate regression models for multiple confounders – e.g. pur-
chasing-power standardized regional GDP per capita, inhabitants per medical doctor, age-
standardized mortality rates – the associations between regional corruption and antibiotic consump-
tion remain persistent and strong. 
 
Methods and data  
Independent variables  
We test two measures of corruption aimed at capturing the two main types of corruption according 
to the corruption research: grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand (high or political) corrup-
tion refers to the degree of public sector capture by parts of the corporate sector. Petty (low or 
bureaucratic) corruption refers to prevalence of bribery in the day-to-day relationships between 
citizens and public service providers. These two types of corruption may obey to different causes. 
Thus, it is reasonable to test proxies for both types of corruption: the perception of corruption in 
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the health care sector as a measure of grand corruption; and citizens’ reported experience with 
bribery as a measure of petty corruption 
To measure grand corruption in the health sector and petty corruption in the society in general, we 
utilize survey data of about 85 000 EU citizens distributed in all the 206 NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 
(Nomenclature des Unite ́s Territoriales Statistiques) regions in Europe. Making use of telephone 
interviews in the local language of each region, randomly drawn respondents from 18 years of age 
or older were asked questions relating to Quality of government on the one hand, and questions 
about demographics, on the other. The survey was administered beginning in February 2013 and 
sampled 400 or more respondents in each region. The robustness and external validity of the data 
has been verified thoroughly (20).  
To measure the perception of corruption in the health care sector (grand corruption), respondents 
were asked to rate on a 10-point-scale to which extent they agreed or disagreed with the following 
statement: ’Corruption is prevalent in the public health care system in my area’ (agree/disagree 0-
10). To measure citizens’ reported experience with bribery (petty corruption), the following ques-
tion was asked: ‘In your opinion, how often do you think other citizens in your area use bribery to 
obtain public services?’. Respondents were asked to answer on a 10-pint scale (never/often, 0-10). 
The indicators of corruption in the health care sector and prevalence of bribes in the society were 
aggregated from the individual-level to the regional level as the mean score. In addition, to increase 
comparability, the measures were standardized.  
The measure of corruption in the health care sector ranges from the Hovedstaden region in De-
mark (1.825, very low levels of health care sector corruption) to the region of Yugozapaden in Bul-
garia (-2.268, very high levels of health care sector corruption). The measure of bribery in society 
ranges from the region of Midtylland in Denmark (0.926, very low levels of bribery) to the region 
of Bucuresti-Ilfov in Romania (4.624, very high levels of bribery).  
Dependent variable  
 The Special Eurobarometer 338 was in field between 13 November and 9 December 2009 and in-
cluded residents aged 15 years or above in all the 27 EU member states. The survey concerned the 
use of antibiotics by Europeans, public knowledge and perceptions about antibiotics, and the impact 
of antibiotic awareness campaigns on the knowledge and practices  of Europeans related to antibi-
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otics. The measure antibiotic consumption, following question was asked in the survey: ‘Have you 
taken any antibiotics orally such as tablet, powder or syrup in the last 12 months?’ In totality, 
about 40 per cent of all respondents answered that they had taken antibiotics during the past year. 
The answers to the question were aggregated to the regional level by using the survey question regard-
ing respondents’ region of residence.  
Confounders  
In the multivariate analysis, the confounders purchasing power standardized regional GDP, region-
al quality of health care, inhabitants per medical doctor, and age-standardized all case mortality 
rates. They were included in the model because they are likely to be correlated with both the main 
independent variable corruption and the main depended variable antibiotic consumption (21).  
The data on purchasing power standardized regional GDP 2011, inhabitants per medical doctor 
and age-standardized all case mortality rates 2008-2011 were obtained from Eurostat’s statistical 
depository. Data on the regional quality of health care was obtained from the European Quality of 
Government Index.  
Statistics  
In the bivariate analysis, scatter plots were built to illustrate the association between the two de-
pended variables prevalence of corruption in the health care sector and prevalence of bribes, in 
relation to antibiotic consumption in the European regions.  
To investigate the association between these variables, Pearson's R were calculated. In the multivar-
iate analysis, OLS regression models were analysed, so as to investigate the link between the inde-
pendent variables and antibiotic consumption, while controlling for regional measures purchasing 
power standardized regional GDP, inhabitants per medical doctor, and age-standardized all case 
mortality rates.  
The correlations between the independent variables were generally low or moderate in strength. 
The correlation between regional GDP and mortality rates turned out to be the strongest (0.692). 
However, multicollinearity diagnostics show that all Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were below 
2.5.  
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To limit the residual from biased estimations of antibiotic consumption from regions with very few 
respondents in the Eurobarometer survey, regions in which less than 50 answers were excluded 
from the analysis. However, all analyses have also been carried out including all regions, and the 
difference between the restricted sample and the full sample is limited.   
 
Results 
Bivariate analysis 
FIGURE 1, CORRUPTION IN IN THE HEALTH SECTOR AND ANTIBIOTIC USE IN THE EUROPEAN 
REGIONS. N=117 
 
Comment: Source: European Quality of Government Index 2013 and Special Eurobarometer 338. Regions with less than 
50 respondents were excluded.  
 
  8 
Figure 1. shows the bivariate correlation between prevalence of corruption in the health sector  and 
antibiotic use in the European regions. Low values in X-axis indicate individuals perceive there is a 
lot of corruption in their region (e.g. Campania, Vest) and high values correspond to perceptions of 
low corruption (e.g. Hovedstaden, Sjaelland). The correlation between these variables is -0.422, and 
significant at the 0.001 level. Individuals living in regions with high corruption in the health sector 
report to consume more antibiotics than individuals in regions with lower levels of corruption. 
 
FIGURE 2,  BRIBERY AND ANTIBIOTIC USE IN THE EUROPEAN REGIONS. N=117 
  
Comment: Source: European Quality of Government Index 2013 and Special Eurobarometer 338. Regions with less than 
50 respondents were excluded.  
 
Figure 1. displays the bivariate correlation between prevalence of bribery and antibiotic use in the 
European regions. Low values in X-axis indicate high levels of bribery in the region (e.g. Bucuresti-
Ilfov, Yugozapaden) and high values correspond to low levels of bribery corruption (e.g. Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommen, Ita-Suomi). The correlation is -0.435 and is significant at the 0.001-level. Indi-
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viduals experimenting bribery is common in their region report to consume more antibiotics than 
individuals in regions where bribery is less prevailing. 
Multivariate analysis 
 
TABLE 1, MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF ANTIBIOTIC 
CONSUMPTION IN THE REGIONS ACCORDING TO CORRUPTION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR, 
PURCHASING POWER STANDARDIZED REGIONAL GDP, INHABITANTS PER MEDICAL DOCTOR, 
AND AGE-STANDARDIZED ALL CASE MORTALITY RATES.  
 
Variable Beta  S.E. 95 % conf. int.  
Corruption in health care sector -10.314*** 1.491 -13.280 – -7.348  
GDP in the regions (In €1000) -0.075 0.162 -0.398 – 0.247 
Inhabitants per medical doctor 0.021 0.117  -0.002 – 0.443 
Age-adjusted all case mortality rates -0.026*** 0.006 -0.004 –  0.002 
Constant 61.065*** 9.409 42.351 – 79.779 
N 88   
R
2 
0.398   
 
Table comment: levels of significance *:P < 0.05; **:P < 0.05; ***: P < 0.005. Source: European Quality of Govern-
ment Index 2012, Special Eurobarometer 338, and Eurostat. Regions with less than 50 respondents were excluded.  
 
In order to check if the bivariate correlation between corruption (or bribery) and antibiotic con-
sumption is spurious, we perform a multivariate analysis where we control for alternative factors 
that could explain divergences in antibiotic consumption, according to the existing literature (21). 
Table 1 shows that the negative association between corruption in the health care sector and anti-
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biotic consumption is highly significant even when we control for the level of regional economic 
development (per capita GDP in the regions) and measures of the quantity (Inhabitants per medical doc-
tor) and the quality (Age-adjusted all case mortality rates) of the health care system. It is noteworthy that 
there was no significant association between medical doctors per capita and antibiotic consump-
tion. Yet there was a significant negative association between age-adjusted all case mortality rates 
and antibiotic consumption. Moreover, there was no significant association between the regional 
per capita GDP and antibiotic consumption.  
 
TABLE 2, MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF 
ANTIBIOTIC CONSUMPTION IN THE REGIONS ACCORDING TO BRIBERY, PURCHASING 
POWER STANDARDIZED REGIONAL GDP, INHABITANTS PER MEDICAL DOCTOR, AND 
AGE-STANDARDIZED ALL CASE MORTALITY RATES.  
 
Variable Beta  S.E. 95 % conf. int.  
Bribery -7.125*** 1.089 -9.29 – -4.960 
GDP in the regions (In €1000) -0.375* 0.158 -0.690 – -0.060 
Inhabitants per medical doctor  0.001 0.011  -0.221 – 0.234 
Age-adjusted all case mortality rates -0.026*** 0.006 -0.038 –  -0.014 
Constant 75.915*** 9.990 56.045 – 95.784 
N 88   
R
2 
0.374   
Table comment: levels of significance *:P < 0.05; **:P < 0.05; ***: P < 0.005. Source: European Quality of Govern-
ment Index 2012, Special Eurobarometer 338, and Eurostat. Regions with less than 50 respondents were excluded.  
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Table 2 replicates Table 1, but this time using the measure of bribery as an independent variable. 
Results are similar. There is a highly significant and strong negative association between bribery and 
antibiotic consumption, even when controlling it for the prevailing confounders in the literature for 
which we have data at regional level. In this case antibiotic consumption is not only significantly 
and negatively associated with the quality of the health at regional level (Age-adjusted all case mortality 
rates), but also with the level of economic development (per capita GDP in the regions), although the 
level of significance is lower. No significant association between Inhabitants per medical doctor and 
antibiotic consumption was found.  
 
Discussion 
If previous research found great variation in antibiotic use across European countries (5-9), this 
study finds a great variation also at sub-national level (10). Similarly, this variation is unlikely to be 
explained by differences in frequency of bacterial infections. Take, for instance, the remarkable 
divergences between the neighbouring regions of Lazio and Toscana, or between Wal-
lonie/Brussels and Flanders. Their pronounced differences in antibiotics consumption cannot ei-
ther be accounted for national cultural dimensions, as previously suggested (22), since regions with-
in the same country perform very differently. Consequently, this study tests a variable that has been 
found as relevant for explaining other health outcomes (12) and for which there is ample evidence 
of remarkable sub-national differences in Europe: corruption (20).   
In particular, this study explores the statistical association between antibiotic consumption and two 
measures corruption in the health sector of the region – one aimed at capturing grand corruption 
(i.e. up to which extent the health care system benefits entrenched interests) and petty corruption 
(i.e. up to which extent patients are asked to pay a bribe in the their relations with health profes-
sionals). The analysis shows a significant and strong negative association between these measures of 
corruption and antibiotic consumption. The percentage of the population stating that they have 
consumed antibiotics last year was significantly lower in regions with low levels of corruption, both 
when corruption is measured as perception of corruption in the health sector as well as when cor-
ruption is measured as direct experience with bribes.  
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To minimize the possibility of a spurious relationship, we include multivariate OLS regression 
models controlling for potential confounders, such as the level of economic development (meas-
ured by the regional GDP per capita) and the quality of the health care in the region (measured by 
the number of inhabitants per medical doctor and age-standardized all case mortality rates). The 
association between the two independent variables (corruption in the health sector and bribery) and 
the dependent variable (antibiotic consumption) is found to be persistent and strong also subjecting 
it to these controls. Indeed, the association between corruption and antibiotic use is stronger 
among wealthy regions than among poorer regions. In the later, the lack of economic resources 
may limit the ability to abuse antibiotics when corruption is widespread. That would be the case in 
the, relatively speaking, economically poor and high corrupt regions in East Europe and Greece, 
where antibiotic use is moderately low. On the contrary, in wealthier regions corruption seems to 
drive antibiotic consumption more neatly. That would be the case of wealthy regions in France, 
Spain or Italy that, nonetheless, have relatively high levels of corruption. These regions have the 
highest use of antibiotics in Europe, remarkably higher than in other Western European regions, 
which are the ones with the lowest antibiotic consumption.  
Which are the mechanisms connecting high levels of corruption and high antibiotic consumption? 
The data presented here cannot identify the particular mechanisms, but a growing body of research 
provides some tentative answers. In general, several scholars have noted that a characteristic of 
health-care is the prevalence of problems of asymmetric information that give opportunities for 
abuse (18). Different players may take advantage of their privileged position for personal gain, in-
cluding the government regulator, the payer (social security, private or public health insurance), the 
provider (public or private), the drug and equipment suppliers, and the patients (23). 
In the first place, researchers have remarked that corruption in the supply of pharmaceutical could 
explain the connection between overall levels of corruption in a country and its health outcomes 
(18). The existence of an influential market of vendors and pharmaceutical firms creates a risk of 
bribery (24), and the discretion health professionals have to decide what medicines, and in what 
quantities, are needed increases the opportunity to abuse (12). These mechanisms may help to ex-
plain the link between measures of corruption in the health sector and antibiotic abuse; that is, the 
connection between the proxy for grand corruption and antibiotic use. In addition, scholars also 
note that the relation between patients and health professionals also presents risks of bribery, as a 
result of information asymmetries and a demand for health services which is largely inelastic (12). 
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Consequently, patients can ask, or be asked to, follow inappropriate procedures (e.g. antibiotics) in 
exchange for under-the-table payments (25). These mechanisms may help to explain the link be-
tween measures of patients’ direct experience with corruption (i.e. bribery) and antibiotic abuse; 
that is, the connection between the proxy for petty corruption and antibiotic use. 
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